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Howard v. United States: Who Should Be
Responsible for the 100 Percent Penalty?
I. INTRODUCTION
Every bookkeeper who has check signing authority for a
corporation of any size is potentially liable for a penalty of 100
percent of the corporation's unpaid withholding tax liability. A
great many bookkeepers are probably not aware of that
possibility.
A number of courts have relied upon dicta in Howard v.
United States' to extend liability for the 100 percent penalty of
Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) section 66722 to corporate
employees who were not even responsible for paying the cor-
poration's withholding taxes.' The problem with this result is
that it penalizes employees responsible for paying other credi-
tors of the corporation, rather than employees responsible for
paying the taxes owed by the corporation.
The 100 percent penalty provision of I.R.C. section 6672
imposes a penalty that can far exceed the maximum criminal
penalties for fraud or tax evasion. For this reason, the Internal
Revenue Service (I.R.S.) should only assess the 100 percent
penalty against persons who are clearly liable for the penalty.
The maximum criminal penalty for tax fraud or evasion is gen-
erally 100,000 dollars,4 whereas liability under the 100 percent
1. Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1983). See infru text
accompanying notes 53-54.
2. I.R.C. § 6672 (West 1988). See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text. Since a corporation is an entity
that is responsible for paying its own taxes, in the context of the 100% penalty, the
issue is actually which persons are responsible for seeing that the corporation pays its
withholding taxes. This Note will use a shorthand description for this fact by simply
referring to such people as persons responsible for paying the corporation's taxes. The
Howard dicta allows a court to find such a person responsible on proof that the person
was responsible for paying other creditors of the corporation, without ever reaching
the issue of whether that person was responsible for paying the taxes. Howard, 711
F.2d at 734. The problem with the dicta is that in some cases those two responsibilities
may not be equivalent.
4. I.R.C. § § 7201-7203 (West 1988). The maximum criminal penalties for tax fraud
or tax evasion for an individual are $100,000 in fines, five years imprisonment, or both,
together with costs of prosecution. Establishing criminal liability requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific intent to defraud the government. In contrast,
as interpreted by courts such as the Howard court, the 100% penalty requires only a
preponderance of the evidence establishing that the "responsible" person knew of the
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penalty provision is unlimited and has been imposed in excess
of 989,000 dollars.5 As Justice Rehnquist said in his dissent in
United States v. Sotelo, the 100 percent penalty provision
"imposes a potentially crushing liability on corporate offi-
cials-a liability that is nondischargeable (in bankruptcy) in its
entirety and virtually in perpetuity."6
This Note will discuss section 6672, including its purpose,
history, and specific requirements. This Note will then discuss
the Howard case and analyze it in terms of the problems asso-
ciated with section 6672. In conclusion, this Note will suggest
solutions to these problems, including a new test for determin-
ing who should be responsible for the 100 percent penalty.
II. SECTION 6672
I.R.C. section 6672, the 100 percent penalty provision, pro-
vides in part:
(a) Any person required to collect, truthfully account for,
and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails
to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over
such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or
defeat such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to
other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal
to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or
not accounted for and paid over.7
This penalty is most frequently assessed when federal
taxes withheld from employees' wages have not been paid to
unpaid corporate taxes and paid a creditor in preference to the government. See
Moran, WilVfulness. The Inner Sanctum or Unnecessary Element of Section 6672, 11
U. TOL. L. REv. 709, 714-15, 753-54 n.151 (1980) [hereinafter Moran].
5. Simpson v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 43, 45 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
6. United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 290 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The
Sotelo majority held that the 100% penalty was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Id. at
282. Justice Rehnquist went on to say:
While the lifelong liability which the Court imposes today falls on the
shoulders of one who was the chief executive officer of a small family
business, there is unfortunately nothing in the Court's reasoning which would
prevent the same liability from surviving bankruptcy in the case of a
comptroller, accountant, or bookkeeper who reaped none of the fruits of
entrepreneurial success other than continued employment in the corporation
and in some cases possibly not even that.
Id. at 290-91.
7. Section 6672(a) states further that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed under § 6653
for any offense to which this section is applicable." Section 6672(b) provides rules for
the posting of a bond to extend the period of collection of the penalty in order for the
taxpayer to bring a suit to challenge the assessment of the penalty.
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the I.R.S. by the employer. "Person," as used in section 6672,
is defined by section 6671 of the I.R.C. to include "an officer or
employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a part-
nership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a
duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation
occurs." Courts have generally held that two separate
requirements must be met for a person to be held subject to
the 100 percent penalty.9 First, the person must be a "respon-
sible person," that is, the person must be under a duty to col-
lect, truthfully account for, and pay over the taxes.10 Second,
the person must have willfully failed "to collect, truthfully
account for, and pay over the tax."' '
A. Purpose of Section 6672
The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of section
6672 is to assure compliance by the employer with its duty to
pay such taxes by subjecting the employer's officials responsi-
ble for the employer's decisions regarding withholding and
payment to a severe penalty.'2 The I.R.C. requires employers
to withhold social security and income taxes from employees'
wages.13 Once these taxes are withheld, the I.R.S. credits the
amounts withheld as paid by the employees whether or not the
taxes are ever paid to the I.R.S. by the employer.' 4 The I.R.S.
may have to refund some of these taxes to individual employee
taxpayers, even though the taxes have never been paid to the
I.R.S. by the employer. Although the penalty applies to any
tax collected by a third party for the government, most actions
under section 6672 are for failure by the employer to pay over
employee taxes that have been withheld.'5
8. I.R.C. § 6671(b) (West 1988).
9. See, e.g., Godfrey v. United States, 748 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
10. Id. In Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 250 (1978), the Court held that the
phrase "'[a]ny person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax
imposed by this title' was meant to limit § 6672 to persons responsible for collection of
third-party taxes, [such as withholding taxes,] and was not meant to limit it to those
persons in a position to perform all three of the enumerated duties, that is, collection,
accounting for, and paying the taxes." This Note will use phrases such as "person
responsible to pay the taxes" as a shorthand for a person who is responsible for any
one of the three enumerated duties.
11. I.R.C. § 6672(a) (West 1988); Gbdfrey, 748 F.2d at 1574.
12. SModov, 436 U.S. at 247.
13. I.R.C. § § 3102(a), 3402(a) (West 1988).
14. Slodov, 436 U.S. at 243.
15. See, e.g., id. at 240-41; GbOrey, 748 F.2d at 1572-73; Howard v. United States,
711 F.2d 729, 731-33 (5th Cir. 1983).
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The legislative history of section 6672 does not shed a great
deal of light on the congressional intent behind the statute,
however, the fact that the statute first appeared as part of a
criminal statute is significant. That criminal statute was sec-
tion 1308 of the Revenue Act of 1918, which imposed a 100 per-
cent penalty on any "person who willfully refuses to pay,
collect or truly account for and pay over" any excise tax.1
Section 1308 also provided for criminal penalties and the 100
percent penalty could be imposed in addition to the criminal
penalties.' 7
Subsequent acts made changes in numbering and minor
changes in wording.18 The Social Security Act of 1935 incorpo-
rated all of the penalties for excise taxes and made them appli-
cable to social security taxes.'9 The Current Tax Payment Act
of 1943, which provided for withholding of income taxes, incor-
porated the social security penalties, and thus, by double incor-
poration, the 100 percent penalty had become applicable to
withholding of social security and income taxes.20 Up to this
point in the evolution of section 6672, the 100 percent penalty
remained a part of the criminal provisions."
In 1954, Congress attempted to reorganize the I.R.C. to
provide a more logical arrangement.22 In this rearrangement,
Congress severed the 100 percent penalty from the other crimi-
16. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1308, 40 Stat. 1057, 1143, which provides in part:
Any person who willfully refuses to pay, collect, or truly account for and pay
over any such tax shall in addition to other penalties provided by law be liable
to a penalty of the amount of the tax evaded, or not paid, collected, or
accounted for and paid over.
17. Id.
18. For example, Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1017(d), 43 Stat. 253, changed
"refuses" to "fails" and extended the 100% penalty to a willful attempt to evade or
defeat the tax or its payment, and Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 116-17,
changed the numbering of the 100% penalty statute to § 1114(d).
19. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, § 807(c), 49 Stat. 620, 638.
20. Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 68, ch. 120 § 1627, 57 Stat. 126.
Since the 100% penalty was made applicable to the collection of withholding taxes by
incorporation from previous statutes, the congressional committee reports do not
comment on the purpose of the penalty. See COMMENT BY CoMMrTTEE OF
CONFERENCE, H.R. REP. No. 510, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
SERVICE 2-56 (1943).
21. See Moran, supra note 4, at 748-50.
22. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4025-26 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in U.S.
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4629, 4629-30 (1954). Although both the House and Senate
reports described the 100% penalty, neither report commented on the purpose of the
penalty. HOUSE REPORT, supra, at 4568; SENATE REPORT, supra, at 5245.
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nal provisions because it did not provide for imprisonment. It
was at this time that the 100 percent penalty was numbered as
section 6672 and placed in the code along with other sections
imposing civil penalties.
Although the legislative history of section 6672 says little
about the congressional intent with regard to its interpretation,
it is at least clear from the history of the statute that it was
originally intended as a criminal sanction. ' In this regard, the
construction of specific terms within the statute such as "will-
fully" should be similar to the construction of such terms in
other criminal statutes.2 As will be discussed below, this has
not always been the way such terms have been construed by
the courts. In fact, most courts that have addressed the pur-
pose behind section 6672 have assumed that the purpose is as
stated in the Internal Revenue Manual:
To encourage prompt payment of withheld and other col-
lected taxes as provided by law, and to insure ultimate col-
lection of such taxes from a secondary source in any event,
Congress enacted IRC 6672.26
The original nature of section 6672 as a criminal sanction has
been lost, and the courts have instead described the statute as
an alternate collection device. As stated in Newsome v.
United States: "[s]ection 6672's 'basic purpose is the protection
of government revenue.' "" However, in light of the original
nature of section 6672 as a criminal sanction, the Supreme
Court was more accurate in its statement that the purpose of
23. See Moran, supra note 4, at 748-50. Professor Moran notes that since neither
the House nor the Senate Reports expressed an intent to change the meaning of the
100% penalty, the separation of the penalty from the criminal provisions was in
substance an unconscious separation, effected through a procedural rearrangement of
the tax code. Prior to the 1954 rearrangement, 100% penalty provisions were found at
§ 1718(c) (regarding admissions and dues), § 1921(a)(3) (regarding taxes on documents,
other instruments, and playing cards), § 2557(b)(4) (regarding taxes on narcotics), and
2707(a) (regarding taxes on pistols and revolvers). All of these 100% penalty
provisions were subsections of provisions that generally provided criminal penalties for
fraud and tax evasion. See Internal Revenue Code of 1939, PUB. L. No. 1, ch. 2
§ § 1718, 1921, 2557, 2707, 53 Stat. 1, 193, 202, 274-76, 290.
24. See Moran, supra note 4, at 723-54.
25. Id. at 751-54.
26. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, pt. V, § 711(1) (1987).
27. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26. Section 6672 is a civil penalty, not a
criminal penalty. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, pt. V, § 711(1) (1987).
28. Newsome v. United States, 431 F.2d 742, 745 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting Monday v.
United States, 421 F.2d 1210, 1216 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970)).
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section 6672 is to assure that the duty to pay taxes is fulfilled.'
B. The Requirements for Section 6672 Liability
1. "Responsible Person"
The first requirement for liability under section 6672 is
that the taxpayer must be a "responsible person." A responsi-
ble person,30 as defined by section 6671, includes an officer or
an employee of a corporation, among other persons.3 1 The use
of the term "includes" in section 6671 has generally been found
to be significant in that the persons listed under the statute are
not construed to exclude all others.s2 On the other hand, hold-
ing a corporate office does not necessarily make the office-
holder a responsible person.' The overwhelming weight of
authority indicates that a responsible person must have the
power to control the decision-making process by which funds
are allocated to other creditors in preference to paying taxes
that are due. 4
The courts generally look to factors like check signing
authority, day-to-day management of the company, and control
of voting stock as indicators of who has the power to control
the allocation of funds.' For example, in Godfrey v. United
States, the Federal Circuit Court found that a chairman of the
board of directors did not have the power to control the alloca-
tion of funds because he was an outside director with no signif-
29. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 247 (1978).
30. The shorthand phrase "responsible person" has been used in cases decided
under § 6672 to refer to a "person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay
over any tax imposed by this title." See Slodov, 436 U.S. at 246 n.7.
31. I.R.C. § 6671(b) (West 1988), which provides:
The term "person," as used in this subchapter, includes an officer or employee
of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such
officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act in respect of
which the violation occurs.
32. See Commonwealth Nat'l Bank of Dallas v. United States, 665 F.2d, 743, 750-51
(5th Cir. 1982). In that case, the court held that a corporate employer's lending bank
or an officer of that bank may be responsible persons if either "could effectively
determine how [the corporation's] funds were to be spent and which bills would or
would not be paid and when." Id. at 755.
33. Dudley v. United States, 428 F.2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1970). Although Dudley
held the office of president of a corporation that failed to pay its withholding taxes, he
was not liable for the penalty because he had no knowledge of the failure to pay the
taxes until after he no longer had significant control over the corporation.
34. Godfrey v. United States, 748 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See, e.g.,
Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 261 (6th Cir. 1986); Haffa v. United States, 516
F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1975); White v. United States, 372 F.2d 513, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
35. Godfrey, 748 F.2d at 1576.
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icant voting stock, no check signing authority, and no
involvement in the day-to-day management of the corpora-
tion.36 He was therefore not liable for the 100 percent
penalty.37
2. "Willfulness"
The second requirerAent for liability under section 6672 is
that the responsible person acted "willfully." The test for will-
fulness was established by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Bloom v. United States.' For a person to be found to have
acted willfully within the meaning of the statute, that person
must have performed a "voluntary, conscious and intentional
act to prefer other creditors .. .over the United States." In
Bloom, the court found that payments on a bank loan and pay-
ments of net wages to employees made while taxes were owing
amounted to a willful failure to pay over the taxes.4°
A willful act can certainly be described as a voluntary,
conscious, and intentional act. However, as pointed out by Pro-
fessor Moran of the University of Toledo College of Law in his
article on section 6672 willfulness, the test should be applied to
the obligation of paying the taxes, not to the interim question
36. Id. Godfrey was an attorney with tax expertise who was elected as chairman
of the board of Career Academics, Inc. He accepted the chair to provide consultation
and advice concerning Career's financial and personnel problems. Godfrey was
essentially an outside director with no power to control the allocation of funds, no
check signing authority, and no involvement in the day-to-day management of the
corporation. Id. at 1571. The court found that he was not a responsible person because
he had no control over the allocation of funds. Id. at 1576. There was no evidence to
show that Godfrey knew of the failure to pay taxes that led to the imposition of the
100% penalty, and therefore the court also found that the failure to pay the taxes was
not willful on his part. Id. at 1577-78.
37. Id. at 1579.
38. Bloom v. United States, 272 F.2d 215, 233 (9th Cir. 1959), cert denied, 363 U.S.
803 (1960).
39. This Note will hereinafter refer to this test as the "Bloom test," ie., an act to
prefer other creditors over the government with knowledge that taxes are due
establishes willfulness. Id.
40. Id. at 218, 223. Bloom was the president and chief executive officer of Idaho
Smelting, Inc., and virtually its sole stockholder. Bloom argued that he was prevented
from paying the taxes by the corporation's financing bank, but the court found that
the evidence did not support that argument. Instead, the court held that Bloom's
voluntary, conscious, and intentional acts to prefer other creditors over the
government established that he had acted willfully in not paying the taxes.
Bloom concerned taxes from 1947-48, prior to the 1954 Code, which placed the
100% penalty provision at § 6672. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
Bloom's penalty was therefore assessed under § 2707(a), a 100% penalty provision that
was applicable to social security taxes and income tax withholding through § § 1400
and 1627. Bloom, 272 F.2d at 217.
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of whether payment to other creditors was voluntary, con-
scious, and intentional.4 It does not necessarily follow that a
taxpayer who pays another creditor intends not to pay taxes.
Nevertheless, the Bloom test is currently applied by most
courts. In recent cases, courts have held that the Bloom test
allows for a finding of willfulness as a matter of law.'
However, a question definitely has arisen about whether
the Bloom test has any validity after the decision of the
Supreme Court in Slodov v. United States, in which Justice
Brennan's majority opinion stated that "[t]he fact that the pro-
vision imposes a 'penalty' and is violated only by a 'willful fail-
ure' is itself strong evidence that it was not intended to impose
liability without personal fault."43 Slodov involved a taxpayer
who assumed control of a financially troubled corporation that
had no funds to pay past due taxes. The Court held that
Slodov did not willfully fail to pay the taxes that had accrued
prior to his assumption of control by using after-acquired funds
to pay other creditors." Slodov had paid other creditors while
taxes were due, which would have been enough to establish
liability under the Bloom test. However, he had no personal
fault in the failure to pay the taxes when they were originally
due.
The possibility that Slodov may have invalidated the
Bloom test was first considered by the court in In re Osborn.5
41. Moran, supra note 4, at 770. Professor Moran points out that although the
payment of other creditors while taxes are due is evidence of an intentional failure to
pay the taxes, it is far from being conclusive evidence of such an intent. See ikfra
notes 84-87 and accompanying text for examples of instances in which other creditors
might be paid without an intentional failure to pay the taxes.
42. See, e.g., Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 735 (5th Cir. 1983); Mazo v.
United States, 591 F.2d 1151, 1157 (5th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979).
43. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 254 (1978). Mr. Slodov, an orthodontist,
purchased the stock of three corporations engaged in food vending. At the time of the
purchase, the corporations owed about $250,000 in taxes withheld from employee
wages, and the corporations had no funds with which to pay the taxes. Slodov did not
use any of the funds that the corporations acquired after the purchase to pay these
taxes, and within six months of the purchase, the corporations filed for bankruptcy.
The Court held that Slodov was not liable for the 100% penalty for the taxes that
accrued before his purchase of the corporations because he had no personal fault in
not paying the taxes when they were originally due.
44. Id. at 259-260.
45. 4 Bankr. 431, 436 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1979). Mr. and Mrs. Osborn were sole
stockholders and managing officers of two corporations that had declared bankruptcy
while withholding taxes were still outstanding. Because of previous problems, Mr.
Osborn had promised the I.R.S. that he would deposit gross payrolls in a separate bank
account and then pay only the net wages out of that account, leaving the withholding
taxes in trust for the government. He failed to keep that promise and paid operating
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However, because the Osborn court held the taxpayer's con-
duct to have been willful under either the Bloom test or the
Slodov test, the court did not reach a conclusion on the issue.46
The court in Feist v. United States stated that under Slodov,
the Bloom test could not be applied to the exclusion of other
evidence bearing on the personal fault of the taxpayer.47 That
Slodov had made personal fault a necessary element of willful-
ness was fully recognized by the Federal Circuit Court in God-
frey.48 Professor Vasek of the University of Kentucky, in his
article on section 6672, points out that the dissent in Slodov
interpreted the majority opinion as rejecting the Bloom test,
which he describes as the "conscious act or omission" test.4 9
According to Professor Vasek, Slodov replaced the Bloom test
with the "personal fault" test.5° Since the Bloom test focuses
on payments to other creditors, the test does not require per-
expenses out of the account. His personal fault in failing to keep his promise, together
with his payments to other creditors, made his actions willful under either test.
46. Id.
47. Feist v. United States, 607 F.2d 954, 962 (Ct. Cl. 1979). In Feist, the taxpayer
owned a controlling interest in a corporation engaged in the retail department store
business. He was also the corporate treasurer and chairman of the board of directors.
Just prior to the completion of a sale of the stock in the corporation to another
company, he was informed that the corporation was delinquent in withholding tax
deposits. The buyer assured him that the taxes would be paid immediately, but the
buyer failed to pay the taxes after a principal in the buyer's company embezzled a
large amount of the money left in the corporation. The court held that, under Slodor,
personal fault is a necessary element of willfulness. The court found that Feist had
acted in good faith and could not be held at fault for the embezzlement of funds with
which he had intended the taxes be paid.
48. Godfrey v. United States, 748 F.2d 1568, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984). After reciting
the Bloom test, the Godfrey court said that "willfulness must also be viewed in light of
the 'personal fault' of the plaintiff." Id. (citing Siodov, 436 U.S. at 254). The evidence
failed to establish that Godfrey knew of the tax delinquency, and therefore the
government failed to establish Godfrey's personal fault. Id.
49. Vasek, The Hidden Tax Trap of LRC Section 6672, 67 Ky. L.J. 43 (1978)
[hereinafter Vasek].
50. Id. at 73. That the Slodov court replaced the Bloom test with the personal
fault test may be seen by the fact that application of the Bloom test would have found
Slodov liable for the 100% penalty for the taxes that were unpaid before he assumed
control of the corporation. This is because Slodov paid other creditors of the
corporation instead of paying the taxes that were due. In not finding Slodov liable for
the penalty for those taxes, the court held that there must be personal fault in not
paying the taxes, not merely personal fault in paying other creditors. The fact that
many courts have overlooked the Slodov Court's replacement of the Bloom test is
probably due to a tendency of some courts, and attorneys briefing those courts, to
distinguish Slodov on its peculiar facts. See, e.g., Wood v. United States, 808 F.2d 411
(5th Cir. 1987), in which the court found the Slodov test inapplicable because Wood
was "a responsible person both before and after the obligations at issue accrued," and
therefore the court applied the Bloom test. This confusion results from the fact that
the Slodov Court did not apply the personal fault test to tax obligations that accrued
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sonal fault regarding nonpayment of taxes and is therefore
inconsistent with the personal fault required by Slodov. After
reading Justice Brennan's opinion in Slodov and Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Sotelo, it is hard to imagine that a
majority of the present Supreme Court would not agree that
Slodov overruled the Bloom test.
In sum, the purpose of section 6672 is to insure compliance
with an employer's duty to pay taxes by subjecting the persons
responsible to a severe penalty. Liability under section 6672
has two prerequisites. First, the person must be responsible
for collecting, truthfully accounting for, and paying over the
tax. To determine who is a responsible person, the courts gen-
erally look to factors that indicate who has the power to con-
trol the decision-making process for the allocation of funds.
Second, the responsible person must have willfully failed to
collect, truthfully account for, and pay over the tax. Courts
use one of two tests to determine willfulness. Many courts still
use the Bloom test, which establishes willfulness by showing
that the person paid creditors other than the government,
knowing that taxes were due. However, many authorities
argue that the Supreme Court replaced the Bloom test with
the test in Slodov by requiring that personal fault for not pay-
ing the taxes must be shown.
III. THE HOWARD DECISION
A. Facts
Waymon Leon Howard, the appellant in Howard, was a
director, minority shareholder, treasurer, and executive vice-
president of Eden Marketing Corporation (Eden), a Texas cor-
poration. Paul Jennings was Eden's chief executive officer and
majority shareholder. Howard was responsible for Eden's day-
to-day operations. For a substantial period of time he was the
only authorized signatory on Eden's main checking account.
For the remainder of his time with Eden, he shared check
signing authority with Eden's comptroller; however, only one
signature was required on checks drawn. Early in Howard's
tenure with Eden, he had issued an 8,000 dollar check for back
withholding taxes to the I.R.S. The I.R.S. credited the money
to an outstanding liability of one of Jennings' previous partner-
while Slodov was in control of the corporation because Slodov conceded liability for
the penalty for those taxes.
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ships. On discovering Howard's action, Jennings relieved How-
ard of his duties for several weeks. Upon reinstating Howard,
Jennings instructed him not to pay any bills without approval.
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit Court found that Howard satis-
fied both prongs of the 100 percent penalty provision in that he
was a "responsible person" and his failure to pay the withhold-
ing taxes of the corporation was "willful."' He was therefore
found liable for the 100 percent penalty in the amount of
22,671 dollars.5"
Under the first prong of the 100 percent penalty provision,
the court found that Howard was a responsible person by look-
ing to his status and duties within Eden. The court, in dicta,
went on to say that although Howard might have been fired if
he had disobeyed his superior by paying the taxes, Howard was
not relieved of his responsibility to do so. 53 Although the facts
indicate that Howard did have a high level of responsibility at
Eden, other courts have used this dictum to unjustly extend
liability to persons with less authority than Howard.5
Under the second prong of the 100 percent penalty provi-
sion, the court applied the Bloom test and found willfulness as
a matter of law because Howard made payments to creditors
other than the I.R.S. with knowledge that taxes were due. 5
The court did not consider, however, that this test may no
longer be good law in light of the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Slodov.
B. Analysis by the Howard Court
1. New Responsible Person Test
In an apparent attempt to find guidelines as to whether
Howard was a "responsible person," the first requirement for
liability under section 6672, the Howard court fashioned a new
three-part test: "[r]esponsibility in this context is a matter of
51. Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 733-36 (5th Cir. 1983). Citing Newsome
v. United States, 431 F.2d 742, 747 (5th Cir. 1970), the Howard court suggested that a
failure to pay the taxes was not willful if there was a "reasonable cause" for the
failure. However, both the Newsome and Howard courts suggest that the reasonable
cause exception is quite limited in scope, and neither opinion gave any examples of a
"reasonable cause."
52. Howard, 711 F.2d at 733.
53. Id. at 734.
54. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 779 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1986); Freeman v.
United States, 603 F. Supp. 272 (D. Ariz. 1985), aff'd mem., 817 F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1987).
55. Howard, 711 F.2d at 736.
1989]
462 University of Puget Sound Law Review
status, duty and authority."' The court found that Howard
had the requisite status because he was a director, shareholder,
treasurer, and executive vice-president of Eden.57 The court
found that Howard had a duty to ensure that Eden's taxes
were paid because he ran the day-to-day operations of the com-
pany and was a signatory on the corporation's main checking
account.5 The court defined "authority" as the "effective
power to pay" and found that Howard had such authority
because he issued small checks on several occasions without
the approval of Paul Jennings, the chief executive officer and
majority shareholder of Eden.5 9 As used in Howard, status,
duty, and authority are three factors for the court to consider
and weigh in determining a corporate employee's responsibility
for paying taxes; some indicia of each factor must be present in
order to establish liability.'
In finding that Howard had the requisite authority, the
court stated that "[t]he fact that Jennings might well have
fired Howard had he disobeyed Jennings' instructions and paid
the taxes does not make Howard any less responsible for their
payment. '61 Having already decided that Howard had the
authority to pay the taxes, the court reasoned that he would
have only lost the authority after he had paid them. 2
The conclusion, in dicta, that Howard was responsible,
notwithstanding that he would have been fired for paying the
taxes, has been followed by several subsequent cases finding
persons even less responsible than Howard liable for the 100
percent penalty. In Roth v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit
Court cited Howard with approval while imposing section 6672
liability against a vice president who was neither a director nor
a stockholder of the corporation and who was specifically
instructed by the corporation's president not to pay the taxes.63
56. Id. at 734. This test was suggested by Mazo v. United States, 591 F.2d 1151,
1156 (5th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979) ("responsibility is a matter of
status, duty and authority, not knowledge").
57. Howard, 711 F.2d at 734.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 733-35.
61. Id. at 734. Howard was an appeal of a summary judgment ruling. The court,
therefore, had to consider the facts in the light most favorable to Howard and had to
accept the possibility that Howard might have been fired for paying taxes as a fact. Id.
at 733.
62. Id. at 734.
63. Roth v. United States, 779 F.2d 1567, 1571-72 (11th Cir. 1986).
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In Freeman v. United States, the court relied on Howard " to
impose section 6672 liability against Jerry Taylor, a treasurer,
corporate director, and eight percent stockholder, who had
been hired as a bookkeeper one year before the unpaid taxes
accrued.' Taylor presented evidence that he would have been
fired if he had paid the taxes.6' Taylor was found liable for a
penalty of 48,960 dollars, although he was hired at an annual
salary of only 18,000 dollars. As the Freeman case illustrates,
the appliction of the Howard dicta may result in a penalty that
is completely disproportionate to salary. However, courts per-
sist in following the dicta in Howard and continue to find that
the threat of being fired is not enough to relieve someone of
the responsibility to pay taxes.67 Prior to Howard, the test for
a responsible person focused on who had the power to deter-mine which creditors will be paid. In the line of cases spawned
by Howard, that focus has been lost.
The three-part test to determine a responsible person
announced in Howard-status, duty, and authority-could be
useful, but the focus of this test is wrong because it does not
focus on what the court is trying to determine. It must be
remembered that what a court is trying to determine is
whether the taxpayer is a "person required to collect, truth-
fully account for, and pay over any tax."'
Status as a separate factor from duty tends to skew the
focus of the inquiry. As stated in Dudley v. United States, cor-
porate office (or any other indicator of status) does not of itself
establish responsibility.69 However, a person's status within a
corporation may be relevant to the inquiry because it could be
indicative of a duty, as for example when the bylaws of a cor-
poration provide that the corporate treasurer is responsible for
paying taxes. Status may also indicate a duty of oversight of
64. Freeman v. United States, 603 F. Supp. 272, 275 (D. Ariz. 1985), Qff'd mem.,
817 F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1987).
65. Id. at 273.
66. Id. at 274.
67. See, e.g., Gephart v. United States, 818 F.2d 469, 474-75 (6th Cir. 1987); In re
Green, 89 Bankr. 466, 475-76 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Turner, 35 Bankr. 811, 815
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1983), off'd, 43 Bankr. 752 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984), remanded mem., 760
F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1985). For other cases that have cited the Howard dicta with
approval, see Thibodeau v. United States, 828 F.2d 1499, 1504-05 (11th Cir. 1987);
Simpson v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 43, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Johnson v. United
States, 583 F. Supp. 127, 130 (W.D. Ky. 1984); In re Terrell, 74 Bankr. 291, 297-99
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1987).
68. I.R.C. § 6672(a) (West 1988).
69. 428 F.2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1970).
1989] 463
464 University of Puget Sound Law Review
the payment of taxes. The proper test should focus on duty
and authority because these are the key indicators of responsi-
bility, with status merely a factor to consider in determining
whether a duty exists.
Duty is clearly an important element of responsibility in
this context, but the inquiry should focus on whether the tax-
payer had a duty within the corporate structure to pay the
taxes or to see that the taxes were paid, rather than on
whether the taxpayer had a duty to pay other creditors. The
Howard court apparently found duty in the fact that Howard
ran Eden's day-to-day operations and was a signatory on Eden's
main checking account.70 Although those facts could evince a
possible duty to pay taxes in some cases, the Howard court's
inquiry stopped short of the ultimate question of whether
Howard had a duty to pay the taxes. In fact, the only evidence
on this question discussed by the court indicates that paying
taxes was specifically excluded from Howard's duties by
Jennings.
The authority portion of the Howard test comes closest to
the generally accepted test for a responsible person--determin-
ing who had the power to control the decision-making process
by which funds are allocated to other creditors in preference to
paying taxes that are due." The focus of even this generally
accepted test is wrong. Although it obviously parallels the
Bloom test for willfulness- preferring other creditors over the
I.R.S.-the focus should be on whether the taxpayer had the
authority to pay the taxes. It is unlikely that a different out-
come would result from a shift in focus since, in most cases,
one with the authority to pay other creditors would also have
the authority to pay taxes. However, the Howard case itself is
a good example of the problem created by an incorrect focus.
The court found that Howard had authority to pay taxes by the
fact that he issued several small checks to other creditors with-
out Jennings' approval. 72 This simply does not reach the ques-
tion of whether Howard had authority to pay the taxes.
The most unfortunate part of the Howard decision is the
court's statement that even though Jennings might have fired
Howard, Howard was nevertheless a responsible person. As
pointed out in the District Court decision in Roth v. United
70. 711 F.2d at 734.
71. Godfrey v. United States, 748 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
72. Howard, 711 F.2d at 734.
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States, this statement expanded the existing view about who
was a responsible person by reaching persons who have no dis-
cretion to ensure that taxes are paid.73 In reaching its conclu-
sion, the Howard court used circular reasoning. The court first
found that Howard was a responsible person and then said that
the fact that he could have been fired did not relieve him of
that responsibility.74 However, the court should have consid-
ered whether Howard could be fired for paying the taxes in
determining whether Howard had the authority to pay the
taxes in the first place. The court begged the question by using
its own determination of Howard's responsibility as part of its
analysis of his responsibility.
The District Court in Roth refused to follow Howard, stat-
ing that the Howard decision was a "totally surprising and
unnecessary departure" from existing law.75 The Roth District
Court stated that the Howard decision "unjustifiably and
harshly penalizes an individual who acted as would any reason-
able man under those circumstances."76 In reversing the Roth
District Court, the Eleventh Circuit Court committed exactly
the same error of begging the question as did the Howard
court.77  The court used its own determination of Roth's
responsibility as part of its analysis of his responsibility.
It is interesting to note that the Eleventh Circuit stated
and then rejected a suggestion purported to be from the trial
court that "to follow the precept of Howard would be to con-
done the corporation's vice presidents using corporation money
73. Roth v. United States, 53 AFrR 2d 84-1153, 84-1155 (N.D. Ala. 1984), rev'd, 779
F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1986). In order to more easily distinguish these cases, the author
will subsequently refer to them as Roth I and Roth I.
74. Howard, 711 F.2d at 734.
75. 53 AFTR at 84-1155. Roth was the vice president of Leewood Development
Corporation in charge of acquisitions and completion of job projects. He was
authorized to write checks on several accounts of the corporation and was the sole
signatory on the payroll account. On a motion for summary judgment filed by the
government, Roth produced evidence that the corporation's president, Dobbins,
determined which creditors would be paid and that Roth was told by Dobbins not to
pay the taxes. Roth's evidence showed that he had been assured by Dobbins that the
taxes would be paid with funds from a pending sale of apartments that were owned by
Dobbins. The District Court explicitly rejected the reasoning of Howard and found
that Roth was not a responsible person. Id. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly
followed Howard and reversed the District Court, granting summary judgment to the
government. Roth II, 779 F.2d at 1572.
76. 53 AFTR 2d at 84-1155.
77. Roth II, 779 F.2d at 1572. Chief Justice Godbold commented on the circularity
of the majority's reasoning. Id. at 1575 (Godbold, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part.)
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contrary to the instructions of the president and that this
would be equated with embezzlement."78 The Howard decision
does in fact put a corporate employee instructed not to pay
taxes in the position of having to choose between facing the
100 percent penalty or paying the taxes to prevent personal lia-
bility for the penalty. The unauthorized use of corporate funds
for personal benefit in any other context would be considered
embezzlement.
There are thus three problems with the court's analysis of
the responsible person element. First, the court's use of status
as an independent factor tends to skew the analysis since the
status is merely an indicator of duty. Second, the focus of the
duty and authority factors is incorrect since the focus is on the
duty and authority to pay other creditors, rather than on the
duty and authority to pay taxes. Third, the court engaged in
circular reasoning by using its own determination of Howard's
responsibility in analyzing his responsibility.
2. Willfulness
On the question of willfulness, the Howard court recited
the Bloom test.79 Howard made out thirty-six checks to credi-
tors other than the I.R.S. after he knew that Eden owed taxes.
According to the Bloom test, Howard willfully failed to pay the
taxes as a matter of law."° In its discussion of willfulness, the
court quoted a portion of the Slodov decision concerning per-
sonal fault,"' but dismissed any consideration of Howard's per-
sonal fault by saying that Howard had a choice because "[h]e
could have paid the taxes, accepted the consequences (presum-
ably being fired), and thus avoided the penalty."82
Under Slodov, a different result would be almost certain.
Slodov also had a choice of paying the taxes or other creditors
and decided to pay the other creditors, but the Slodov court
focused on his personal fault in not paying the taxes. The
Howard court did not look beyond the fact that Howard made
out checks to other creditors.
The Howard court is certainly not alone in continuing to
apply the old Bloom test to the question of willfulness, 3 but
78. Id. at 1572.
79. Howard, 711 F.2d at 735.
80. Id.
81. See supra text accompanying note 43.
82. Howard, 711 F.2d at 735.
83. See, e.g., Mulee v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 1181, 1185 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (citing
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this application is difficult to justify in light of Slodov. The
Bloom test is certainly beneficial to the I.R.S. All that the gov-
ernment must do under Bloom is to introduce checks to other
creditors into evidence and establish that the person knew that
taxes were due and it has won its case. However, due to the
potentially staggering penalties that can be imposed under sec-
tion 6672, the Slodov personal fault test is necessary to insure
that the taxpayer willfully failed to pay the taxes, not just that
the taxpayer willfully paid some other bills. The Bloom test
imposes absolute liability on a responsible person, in spite of
the legislative history of section 6672. The legislative history
shows that the use of the word "willfully" in the statute origi-
nally indicated the same level of culpability as where the word
"willfully" is used in criminal statutes.
Although in most cases the use of the personal fault test
will not produce a different outcome than the Bloom test,
there are a few significant examples in which the outcome
would be different. The Fifth Circuit in Newsome found will-
fulness when a taxpayer paid other creditors even before the
taxes were due.s4 Probably because of that decision, the How-
ard court found it unnecessary to specify whether the checks
that Howard issued to other creditors were issued before or
after the taxes were due. However, it is extremely difficult,
without more evidence, to translate a payment to another cred-
itor before the taxes are due into a willful failure to pay the
taxes. The courts should at least consider whether such a pay-
ment could reasonably have been expected to preclude pay-
ment of the taxes when they did become due.
Another example of a case in which the outcome would be
different under a personal fault test was addressed by the
Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 735 (5th Cir. 1983)); In re Flemister, 48 Bankr.
427, 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985) (the court cites Howard for the Bloom test and then
goes on to say that signing blank checks with knowledge that taxes are not being paid
constitutes willful failure).
84. Newsome v. United States, 431 F.2d 742, 745 (5th Cir. 1970). Under the
Newsome facts, it was evident that Newsome used funds to pay other creditors when it
was highly likely that the corporation would not have the funds to pay the taxes when
they became due. Under those facts, the Newsome holding was correct. The difficulty
would arise when this holding is coupled with the use of the Bloom test for a finding of
willfulness as a matter of law, without examining the surrounding facts to determine
the likelihood that the payment to another creditor would prevent payment of the tax
when due. The payment of another creditor, together with a subsequent failure to pay
taxes, should not be enough to establish the personal fault necessary for the 100%
penalty.
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Slodov Court.' As discussed in Slodov, the I.R.S. frequently
allows a financially troubled corporation with few unencum-
bered assets to continue operations in the hope that the Ser-
vice will thereby increase its chances of collecting unpaid
taxes. Often in this instance, a monthly payment plan is set up
for payment of back taxes." Under the Bloom test, a
subordinate corporate employee could be held liable for the
100 percent penalty for paying a supplier even while such
monthly payments are being made. This would occur if the
corporation eventually fails and files for bankruptcy, regard-
less of whether the employee was at fault for not paying the
taxes in the first place.
A third example of a situation in which the outcome
would be different under the personal fault test is the situation
in Roth. In that case, Roth was instructed not to pay the taxes
but was assured by the president of the corporation that the
taxes would be paid by proceeds from the sale of other assets
owned by the president. Roth apparently relied on this assur-
ance. The Eleventh Circuit did not address the issue of Roth's
reliance on the president's assurance.87 It would be difficult to
find personal fault in such a situation without a further show-
ing that such reliance was unreasonable.
A final example that might produce a different outcome
85. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 252 (1978).
86. Installment agreements for the payment of delinquent taxes are described in
INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, pt. V, § 5331.1 (1987). One element of the installment
agreement is always that the future taxes will be paid in a timely fashion. Id. As
discussed in Slodov, in the Bloom test the 100% penalty on the entire outstanding tax
liability would attach to a corporate officer on the payment of the first dollar to a
supplier, regardless of whether the corporation was being allowed to continue
operating under a payment plan and regardless of any personal fault on the part of the
officer in the failure to pay the tax in the first place. Slodov explicitly overruled this
application of the Bloom test. However, as suggested in note 50 supra, some courts
tend to limit Slodov to situations where the officer was not employed by the company
at the time the tax liability accrued.
87. The District Court did take Roth's reliance into account in its analysis. Roth I,
53 AFTR 2d at 84-1155. The Eleventh Circuit also quoted from testimony that showed
that Roth had relied on the president's assurances, and although the court stated that
it must treat the case as though the jury believed this testimony, it never discussed
Roth's reliance. In fact, the court never discussed the willfulness issue at all. The
court found that, under the authority of Howard, Roth was a responsible officer and
the president's instructions to Roth not to pay the taxes did not relieve Roth of that
responsibility. Roth II, 779 F.2d at 1569-70. According to the court, since Roth was a
responsible person, he was responsible for the penalty (apparently irrespective of his
willfulness). In any case, under the Bloom test, Roth's reliance would have been
irrelevant. He had paid another creditor knowing that taxes were due, and therefore
his actions were willful under that test, regardless of the assurances.
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under the personal fault test involves the policies of the I.R.S.
in the allocation of payments. Frequently, the I.R.S. allocates
receipts of tax payments to taxes other than the withholding
taxes that the taxpayer is attempting to pay, as it did in the
case of the 8,000 dollar payment that Howard made. The pol-
icy of the I.R.S. is to apply payments to other taxes whenever
possible if the taxpayer has failed to specify which taxes are to
be paid. This policy exists because the 100 percent penalty
gives the Service an alternative means of collecting withhold-
ing taxes, which it does not have for other corporate taxes.
The purpose of this practice is to maximize tax collections.
However, as pointed out by Professor Vasek, in such instances
the nonpayment of the taxes "is caused more by the IRS allo-
cation method than by the personal fault of the responsible
person."'
Thus, there are some cases in which the personal fault test
will produce a different outcome than the Bloom test. In light
of Slodov, the different outcome in those cases is entirely
justified.
C. Why the Decision in Howard is Wrong
The decision of the Howard court is wrong. The court
should not have reached the willfulness issue because Howard
simply was not a responsible person, the first requirement for
liability under section 6672. Howard was not a responsible per-
son because he did not have the authority to pay the taxes.
Howard did not have the authority to pay the taxes because
Jennings had demonstrated that Howard would be fired if he
tried to pay the taxes.
The Howard court reached the wrong decision because the
focus of the test it used for responsibility was wrong. The
focus of the test should be on who has the duty and authority
to pay the taxes. Instead, Howard used a three-part test of sta-
tus, duty, and authority to pay creditors other than the I.R.S.
The Howard court itself seemed to be uncomfortable with
its decision, for in the final paragraph the court stated that:
[W]e cannot help feeling that it is Jennings who should pay
these taxes .... However, Jennings is apparently no longer
within reach of the long arm of the IRS.... Although we
recognize that our holding today may appear harsh to some,
88. Vasek, supra note 49, at 70.
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we are bound to follow the law as interpreted by the
Supreme Court and this Circuit."s
IV. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE ARGUMENT
The I.R.S. views section 6672 as merely an alternative col-
lection device for withholding taxes.' ° Since the I.R.S. is
responsible to the employees of the corporation for taxes with-
held, the position of the I.R.S. is that someone from the corpo-
ration should pay rather than the government.9 1 However, the
I.R.S. only refunds a portion of income taxes withheld and
does not refund social security withholding in most cases until
many years later, if at all. Presumably, most unpaid withhold-
ing taxes are collected through assessment and collection of
the 100 percent penalty against officers who are truly
responsible.
There is nothing in the wording or history of section 6672
to support reading it as an alternate collection device. The
I.R.S. reading is not in accord with the Slodov holding that per-
sonal fault is necessary for imposition of the penalty. It is cer-
tainly not fair to saddle an individual corporate employee who
is not responsible for the problem with a staggering corporate
debt just to provide an alternate means of collection.
Under the alternate collection device theory, it is not
important who is actually responsible. The main concern of
the I.R.S. under this theory is simply to try to reach as many
possible sources for payment of the tax. The 100 percent pen-
alty is similar to joint and several liability. A penalty equal to
the entire withholding taxes owed by the corporation can be
assessed and collected against any one individual who meets
the requirements, even if there is more than one corporate
employee who does.9 2 As decided in Sotelo, the 100 percent
penalty obligation cannot be discharged in bankruptcy; it could
follow a corporate employee for the rest of that employee's
life. Such a potentially crushing liability should be assessed
only against employees actually responsible for not paying the
tax.
The dicta in Howard concerning Howard's possible firing
had he paid the taxes is actually at odds with the Internal Rev-
89. Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 737 (5th Cir. 1983).
90. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
92. Godfrey v. United States, 748 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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enue Manual. Part V, section 726 of the Manual admits that
most employees will do what they are told if a superior orders
them not to pay the taxes. In such a case, the Manual states
that the person who made the determination not to pay the
taxes is the one who is responsible.93
The position of the I.R.S. regarding willfulness is based on
the idea that an employer is supposed to retain withheld taxes
in trust for the government. For this reason, withheld taxes
are commonly referred to as "trust fund taxes."'  To pay
another creditor without leaving enough funds to pay the taxes
is a violation of the trust. This is a nice theory, but as some of
the examples given above indicate, it does not always square
with the reality of the situation. In addition, in many, if not
most, cases in which a company is in trouble, there is only
enough money to pay net wages when payroll is due. There
are no funds available at that time to make up the "trust."
The Bloom test for willfulness, which is preferred by the
I.R.S.,95 makes an employee liable for using after-acquired
funds for other purposes, even without an intent to defeat the
tax. However, the Slodov court expressly found that after-
acquired funds are not impressed with a trust. Willfulness
should only be attributed to those persons who either willfully
pay net wages without enough funds for the trust fund taxes or
to those persons who willfully fail to pay the taxes, or as stated
in section 6672, "who willfully fail to collect such tax, or truth-
fully account for and pay over such tax."'
Thus, the position of the I.R.S. that the 100 percent pen-
alty is merely an alternate collection devise is not supported by
the wording or history of section 6672 and is not in accordance
93. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, pt. V, § 726 (1987), which states:
An employee is under the dominion and control of his/her employer. He/she
does what he/she is told to do. On record he/she may have the responsibility
to perform the necessary act of withholding and paying over the trust fund
taxes, but is nevertheless subject to his/her employer's specific direction. If
he/she is told not to pay the tax, most likely he/she will not. Therefore, any
allegation that an employee is the responsible person should be thoroughly
investigated. In any event, the same tests would be applied to any person,
including an employee. If the employee was the one who made the decision or
the determination, he/she would be the one who would be held liable.
94. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. at 238, 243 (1978).
95. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, pt. V, § 731(1) (1987). This section still states
the Bloom test for willfulness. The Manual limits the application of Slodov to the
precise facts of Slodov. Id. at § 722.
96. Siodov, 436 U.S. at 254.
97. I.R.C. § 6672 (West 1988).
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with Slodov. Moreover, the extension of liability in Howard to
persons who might be fired if they paid the taxes is at odds
with the position of the I.R.S. as stated in the INTERNAL REVE-
NUE MANUAL. Finally, the trust fund theory of the I.R.S. con-
cerning willfulness, to the extent that it incorporates the
Bloom test, is not in accord with the personal fault require-
ment of Slodov.
V. PROPOSED TEST FOR RESPONSIBLE PERSON
The Howard court was on the right track in establishing a
three-part test of status, duty, and authority to determine who
is a responsible person under section 6672. However, as noted
in the analysis of the Howard decision, there are problems
with that test as applied in Howard. Those problems would be
alleviated by the adoption of a two-part test of duty and
authority.
In most cases, both duty and authority to pay the taxes
should be established to show that a person is responsible. A
court should follow the example of the Howard court and
examine the evidence to see if there are some indicia of duty
and of authority. A corporation should not be allowed to sub-
vert the test by separating duty and authority, however. There
must always be at least one person in the corporation who is
responsible to see that the withholding taxes are paid. In a
case in which no one has both the duty and authority to pay
the taxes, the more important element is the determination of
who had the authority to determine whether or not the taxes
would be paid.
The most important change that this new test would bring
to the analysis is a shift in focus. This shift would bring the
responsible person analysis in line with the reasoning of
Slodov. The issue is not who had the duty and authority to pay
other creditors. Duty and authority to pay other creditors may
be a strong indication of duty and authority to pay the taxes,
but it must be remembered that the issue is the payment of
taxes, not the payment of other creditors. There may be many
cases in which an employee has the duty and authority to pay
small bills to suppliers who deliver their products to the corpo-
ration but does not possess the corresponding duty and author-
ity to pay the much larger amounts usually associated with the
payment of withholding taxes.
The elimination of status as a separate element in the
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analysis could prove helpful to the government as well as pro-
vide a better focus on the issues. It is quite possible that a
court applying the three-part test could find that an employee
had the duty and authority to pay the taxes, but did not have
the status necessary for section 6672 liability. Since status is
not the issue, this would be an unwarranted result.
Status should come into the analysis as an indicator of the
other two factors. The duty to pay the taxes may be conferred
upon a person of a certain status, such as a treasurer, through
the bylaws of the corporation. The duty in a person of a cer-
tain status may also be inferred from general commercial
usage. In some cases, status may be the only indicator that a
court has to determine who has the duty to pay the taxes. In
other cases, status may indicate a duty to oversee the payment
of taxes, as in the case of a president, especially of a small,
closely-held corporation. Because of oversight duties and over-
lapping or jointly held duties, a number of persons within a
corporation may be liable for the 100 percent penalty. Status
may also indicate authority to pay the taxes when duty is
otherwise established.
The suggested shift in focus should prevent the extension
of liability to a person who would be fired for paying the taxes.
Of course, any subordinate may be fired, and that fact is not
enough to relieve an employee of liability. However, when an
employee has specific instructions from a superior not to pay
the taxes, especially if the instructions are under the express
or implied threat of loss of employment, that employee does
not have the authority to pay the taxes. In that case, it is the
superior who should be responsible for the 100 percent
penalty.
Thus, the new test of who had the duty and authority to
pay the taxes will alleviate the problems associated with How-
ard. The most important change in the test is the shift in focus
from who had the duty and authority to pay other creditors to
who had the duty and authority to pay the taxes. The elimina-
tion of status as a separate element serves to emphasize which
elements are really at issue in the analysis. The shift in focus
will also prevent the extension of liability to an employee who
would be fired for paying the taxes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Two separate requirements must be found for a person to
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be held liable for the 100 percent penalty of section 6672. The
person must be a "responsible person" and must have "will-
fully" failed to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over
taxes. The three-part test defining a responsible person
announced in Howard- status, duty, and authority-should be
reduced to a two-part test of duty and authority, with status
merely an indicator of duty. The focus of this test should be
on finding whether the person had the duty and authority to
pay the taxes. If it can be established that an employee would
have been fired for paying the taxes, this should preclude a
finding that the person had the authority to pay the taxes.
Although universally accepted at one time, the Bloom test
for willfulness-preferring another creditor over paying the
taxes-was never in accord with the legislative history of sec-
tion 6672 because it established absolute liability on a responsi-
ble person to pay the taxes. The history of the statute shows
that a culpability equivalent to criminal willfulness should be
necessary. In any case, the Supreme Court introduced a per-
sonal fault test in Slodov. The lower courts should recognize
this aspect of the Slodov decision and discontinue applying the
old Bloom test as the court did in Howard.
The Howard court strained its reasoning to find Howard
liable because the I.R.S. could no longer collect from Jennings,
the corporation's chief executive officer. In so doing, the court
was in accord with the I.R.S. position that section 6672 is an
alternate collection devise for withholding taxes. However,
that position is not in accord with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Slodov. Also, it is simply unjust to put subordinate cor-
porate employees without authority in the position of facing
the potentially staggering penalties of section 6672 or embez-
zling corporate funds with unauthorized tax payments in order
to protect themselves. The proposed test for a responsible per-
son delineates who has the duty and authority to pay the taxes
and would help to prevent this unjust outcome.
James E. Hungerford
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